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Reasoner: Practice and Procedure

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
I.

VENUE

A South Carolina court in which a civil action is pending is
authorized by statute to grant a motion for a change of venue if
a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in such forum, even
though the venue of the action has been properly established.'
Prejudice directed against the party seeking the change of venue,
if established by supporting affidavits, 2 is generally held to be a
sufficient basis for finding that a fair and impartial trial cannot
be had.3 The South Carolina Supreme Court was faced with the
opposite issue in Stevens v. Sun News Co.' The issue raised by
the defendant newspapers did not concern prejudice directed
against themselves as the movants, but, rather, prejudice in favor
of the adverse party, i.e., plaintiff Stevens.
Factually, the defendant newspapers were being sued on an
alleged libel action by Stevens. Stevens held the office of state
senator and was alleged by the defendants to be a prominent and
influential citizen of Horry County, where the action was initially
instituted. Defendants further alleged that the plaintiff was involved with many locally prominent and politically influential
citizens in a business venture, which was the subject of the allegedly libelous article published by the defendants. Defendants
moved for a change of venue on the basis of these alleged facts,
as well as the fact that one of plaintiff's attorneys was the duly
elected solicitor for the judicial circuit which includes Horry
County. Defendants argued that the political prestige and influence of the plaintiff, his attorney, and his business associates
were so extensive as to deny defendants a fair and impartial trial. 5
1. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-100(2) (1976) provides: "The court may change the place
of trial in the following cases: . . . (2) When there is reason to believe that a fair and
"
impartial trial cannot be had therein ....
The statutory provisions establishing the grounds for a change of venue are, in all
probability, exclusive of all other grounds. Young v. Niblach, 229 Ind. 509, 99 N.E.2d 252
(1951). See also Hanley v. Charleston Light Co., 110 S.C. 340,96 S.E. 519 (1918). However,
the statutory provisions appear to be sufficiently broad so as to bring a multitude of
arguments within their scope.
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-110 (1976).
3. See Johnston v. Belk-McKnight Co. of Newberry, 194 S.C. 490, 10 S.E. 2d 1 (1940);
Louisville Times Co. v. Lyttle, 257 Ky. 132, 77 S.W.2d 432 (1935).
4. 267 S.C. 63, 226 S.E.2d 236 (1976).
5. Proposed Case and Exceptions at 20-22.
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This motion for change of venue was denied by the trial judge and
was appealed by the defendants to the Supreme Court of South
Carolina.
Authority supported both the premise that prejudice -infavor
of an adverse party and its causes are sufficient within the scope
of section 15-7-100(2) of the South Carolina Code to support a
change of venue and the contradictory premise that such are
insufficient to support a change of venue. A close analysis of
Stevens v. Sun News Co.' reveals that the South Carolina Supreme Court has indirectly harmonized the legal theory underlying several prior opinions which appear, on their face, to be inconsistent.7
The case of Johnston v. Belk-McKnight Co. of Newberry8
first enunciated the principle that removal of a cause of action
need not be based solely on prejudice directed against the movant
for a change of venue, but that it is permissible also to base a
change of venue on prejudice directed in favor of the adverse
party. The Johnston court recognized that the purpose of the
venue statute9 is to insure a fair and impartial trial. This goal of
fairness and impartiality can be impaired as easily by a prejudice
within the community which would influence a jury's verdict in
favor of a particular litigant as it would be by prejudice which
would influence a verdict against the movant. °
The question as to what circumstances would constitute prejudice in favor of the adverse party sufficient to impair the fairness
and impartiality of the trial was left unanswered. Other jurisdictions, which have allowed prejudice in favor of an adverse party
as a basis for a change of venue, have held that such prejudice
exists where the adverse party is in such a position of power as
6. 267 S.C. 63, 226 S.E.2d 236 (1976).
7. Varnadoe v. Hicks, 264 S.C. 216, 213 S.E.2d 736 (1975); South Carolina Elec. &
Gas Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 235 S.C. 147, 110 S.E.2d 165 (1959); Johnston v. Belk-McKnight
Co. of Newberry, 194 S.C. 490, 10 S.E.2d 1 (1940).
8. 194 S.C. 490, 10 S.E.2d 1 (1940).
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-100 (1976). See note 1 supra.
10. We are unable to subscribe to the doctrine that the prejudice existing
in the county from which removal is sought must be directed solely against the
applicant [movant] for the change of the place of trial to entitle such applicant
to a change of venue. There may exist no particular prejudice against the applicant, and yet prejudice could exist in favor of the opposing litigant such as to
prevent the applicant from receiving a fair and impartial trial; and a fair and
impartial trial is and should be the goal sought in all trials.
Johnston v. Belk-McKnight Co. of Newberry, 194 S.C. 490, 493, 10 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1940).
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to exert, either directly or indirectly, an undue influence over
those eligible for jury service, thereby promulgating a sense of
favoritism or sympathy in favor of the adverse party." Indeed, the
South Carolina Supreme Court, by way of dictum in two preJohnston cases, has indicated that undue influence on the part
of an adverse party would be sufficient cause for a change of
venue if the opportunity for a fair and impartial trial were impaired." The implication that arises is that undue influence in
favor of or exercised by an adverse party is sufficient to constitute
such prejudice as would necessitate a change of venue under the
Johnston rationale.
The issue of what constitutes prejudice in favor of an adverse
party was squarely presented in South CarolinaElectric & Gas
Co. v. Aetna Insurance Co. 3 Rather than serving to clarify and

further define the situation, however, the decision merely succeeded in confusing the issue further. The popularity, influence,
or good reputation of an adverse party was held not to be a sufficient basis for a change of venue.'" As Johnston v. Belk-McKnight

Co. of New berry'5 was not overruled, it can only be concluded that
this particular party's popularity, influence, or good reputation
was not sufficient to constitute prejudice in favor. Instead, the

popularity and good reputation of the adverse party should be
11. Smith v. Hortler, 4 N.C. (Car. L. Rep.) 131 (1814). Cf. Reyher v. Mayne, 90 Colo.
586, 10 P.2d 1109 (1932) (adverse party in a position of power but the facts as found by
the trial judge did not constitute an abuse of discretion or undue influence).
Many states have statutorily imposed the duty of a change of venue where prejudice
in favor of an adverse party exists in the form of undue influence. See, e.g., ILL. RIV. STAT.
ch. 146, § 4 (1973); Ky. REv. STAT. § 452.010 (1970). Authority also exists to the effect
that such undue influence must not be shown to be general in nature. Instead, the movant
must allege specific instances of the exertion of undue influence: it must be direct and
actual and not indirect and potential. Swiggum v. Valley Inv. Co., 73 N.D. 765, 19 N.W.2d
569 (1945). This requirement that specific acts of undue influence be shown would place
an unbearable burden upon the movant, and North Dakota appears to be unique in this
requirement.
12. Carroll v. Charleston & Seashore R.R., 61 S.C. 251, 39 S.E. 364 (1901); McGown
v. Northeastern R.R., 55 S.C. 384, 33 S.E. 506 (1899). The approval of the change of venue
is dicta because the determination of the need for a change of venue was factual and at
that time could not be reviewed on appeal. The dicta in Carroll are extremely enlightening, since the defendant was the largest employer in the area and a very prominent
businessman and because a number of influential people in the community were concerned and interested in the defendant company. This was felt to have been such a
position of power that it would, by its nature, exert a powerful influence over the minds
of eligible jurors to render a verdict favorable to the adverse party and against the movant.
13. 235 S.C. 147, 110 S.E.2d 165 (1959).
14. Id. at 153, 110 S.E.2d at 168.
15. 194 S.C. 490, 10 S.E.2d 1 (1940).
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considered an asset to such a party, which should be protected.
Rather than providing a definition of what does constitute such
prejudice as approved in Johnston, the court in South Carolina
Electric & Gas Co. v. Aetna Insurance Co.' 8 only expanded upon
what does not constitute such prejudice.17 Thus, a broad reading
of the decision in South CarolinaElectric & Gas Co. would indicate that little remained of any theory that a community attitude
favorable toward a litigant, pervasive enough to affect a jury
verdict, could be used as a basis for a change of venue.
In Stevens v. Sun News Co.'" the court has retreated from
such an expansive reading of South CarolinaElectric & Gas Co.
Rather than adopt a rule that a party's popularity, influence, or
good reputation can never be used to establish prejudice in favor
of the adverse party and, thus, cannot justify a change of venue,

the decision adopted a causal connection approach to a position
of power and prejudice in favor of an adverse party. The court
focused on the restrictive and limiting language of the prior opinions.'" South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. was cited approvingly
16. 235 S.C. 147, 110 S.E.2d 165 (1959).
17. The fact alone that a party to an action is popular, influential, or enjoys
a good reputation is ordinarily not sufficient to warrant a change of venue ....
As stated in Bennett v. Jackson, supra "A good name ordinarily is and rightfully
should be a benefit rather than a burden to its bearer by virtue of which he
should be protected rather than penalized."
Id. at 153, 110 S.E.2d at 168 (quoting Bennett v. Jackson, 172 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1943)).
Several elements should be noted concerning this decision in South CarolinaElec. &
Gas Co. First, the holding regarding a party's popularity, influence, and good reputation
is most probably dicta. The decision of the case turned on the issue of convenience of the
witnesses and the promotion of the ends of justice under S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-100(3)
(1976). Indeed, the issue of a fair and impartial trial under S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-100(2)
(1976) was not even raised in the movant's motion for a change of venue, even though it
was addressed in the movant's affidavit in support of such motion. 235 S.C. at 151-53,
110 S.E.2d at 166-67. If a ground serving as a basis for a motion is not stated, then it
cannot properly be considered. See Ulmers v. Willingham, 238 S.C. 503, 120 S.E.2d 859
(1961).
Second, the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted the rationale of Bennett v. Jackson. This Texas case rested on the premise that popularity is insufficient to establish that
prejudice exists and that a fair trial cannot be had. Texas is one of the states which has
mandated that undue influence constitutes a sufficient basis for granting a change of
venue. TEx. R. Civ. P. R. 257. Thus, South Carolina, by implication, appears to have
adopted in South CarolinaElec. & Gas Co. a distinction between mere popularity on the
one hand and undue influence and prejudice on the other. See note 23 and accompanying
text infra.
18. 267 S.C. 63, 226 S.E.2d 236 (1976).
19. Varnadoe v. Hicks, 264 S.C. 216, 220, 213 S.E.2d 736, 738 (1975) ("The mere fact
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by the Stevens court, but only for the proposition that there is
nothing inherent in a party's position or status which automatically establishes the presence of prejudice within the community
in favor of the adverse party such as to render a fair and impartial
trial impossible and thus justify a change of venue.20 This signifies
an approach considerably different from that established in
South CarolinaElectric & Gas Co. v. Aetna Insurance Co.2 and
probably signals a near return to the theory underlying Johnston
v. Belk-McKnight Co. of Newberry." The movant no longer must
meet the intolerable burden of South CarolinaElectric & Gas Co.
in establishing prejudice in favor of the adverse party on grounds
other than popularity, influence, or good reputation, which an
expansive reading of South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. would
require.
Instead, the movant must distinguish mere popularity and
influence due to the good reputation and status of the adverse
party from prejudice in favor of such party. This prejudice will
exist when the popularity and influence of the adverse party are
found to be so extensive as to have a direct or indirect impact
upon the prospective jurors so as to influence the jury's deliberations beyond the consideration of the facts as presented by the
evidence. It is in the latter situation where the influence that is
inherently exerted by the adverse party due to his good character,
which is permissible in itself, crosses an imaginary boundary so
as to become an undue influence on the jury. This undue influence constitutes prejudice in favor of the adverse party sufficient
23
to justify a change of venue under the Johnston rationale.
that the defendant Hicks holds an official position ...does not justify the conclusion
that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in that county."); South Carolina Elec. &
Gas Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 235 S.C. 147, 153, 110 S.E.2d 165, 168 (1959) ("The fact alone
that a party to an action is popular, influential or enjoys a good reputation is ordinarily
not sufficient to warrant a change of venue.").
20. "Normally, a party's popularity, influence, or reputation is not an adequate basis,
in and of itself, to justify a change of venue. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. v. Aetna
Ins. Co., 235 S.C. 147, 153, 110 S.E.2d 165, 168 (1959)." Stevens v. Sun News Co., 267
S.C. 63, 69, 226 S.E. 2d 236, 239 (1976).
21. 235 S.C. 147, 110 S.E.2d 165 (1959).
22. 194 S.C. 490, 10 S.E.2d 1 (1940).
23. This distinction between mere popularity and influence inherent in a party's
status and such influence so as to subject the jury to foreign considerations outside the
scope of the evidence is crucial to the success of future movants in seeking a change of
venue in a civil action.
Perhaps an extreme and obvious illustration will clarify the point. Plaintiff A is a
large bank in a sparsely populated community. It brings suit against defendant B in the
county in which A is primarily located. Since A is a large bank, a high proportion of the
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The key for the movant is not only to recognize this crucial
distinction and thereby base his motion for a change of venue
upon prejudice in favor of the adverse party due to such party's
undue, not inherent, influence, but also to support this allegation
in fact. The movant must establish a nexus between the position
of power of the adverse party and an actual or potential effect
upon the jury. One method, if not the crucial method, of establishing this causal connection between the undue influence of the
adverse party and the resulting impact upon the jury is the use
of the affidavits required by section 15-7-110 of the South Carolina Code. If the movant can illustrate the undue influence to the
court by securing affidavits from eligible jurors stating that they
could not render, or that they believe that no jury could render,
a verdict solely on the evidence presented without consideration
of the adverse party's position of power, then the movant probably will have established the impact, direct or indirect, upon the
jury of the party's undue influence, sufficient to constitute prejudice and justify a change of venue. This showing by the movant
would be strengthened by the additional showing of the effect
which a verdict against the adverse party would have upon such
party and, thereby, the community. Indeed, the defect which
caused the motion for a change of venue to be denied in Stevens
v. Sun News Co. 4 was the failure on the part of the movant to
establish factually, or even to place before the court facts tending
to establish, this causal connection between the adverse party's
status and any actual or potential effect upon the jury, which
would constitute undue influence and resulting prejudice. 5
people of the county are in debt to plaintiff A and many more are customers of the bank.
Defendant B on the other hand has just moved into his new home Blackacre within the
county from out of state. Defendant B seeks a change of venue. Under the Stevens rationale, if defendant B can show that prospective jurors will be influenced by the debt owed
to plaintiff A or by the other business transacted with plaintiff A, in addition to the merits
of the case, the inherent influence of the bank becomes undue and subjects the jury to
foreign influences which constitute prejudice in favor of plaintiff A and, under Johnston,
justifies a change of venue. See Smith v. Hortler, 4 N.C. (Car. L. Rep.) 131 (1814);
Swiggum v. Valley Inv. Co., 73 N.D. 765, 19 N.W.2d 569 (1945); Carroll v. Charleston &
Seashore R.R., 61 S.C. 251, 39 S.E. 364 (1901); Herd v. Wade, 63 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1933).
Thus, a direct or indirect fear of reprisal from the powerful litigant who is in a position
to do so would clearly constitute sufficient grounds for a change of venue under the
Stevens rationale.
24. 267 S.C. 63, 226 S.E.2d 236 (1976).
25. In the instant case, no affidavits were secured from local residents
stating that they could not render a just verdict if sworn as jurors, or that, based
on their experience as residents of Horry County, any jury selected would be
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The court left open the issue of what burden of proof must
be met by the movant in order to establish a causal connection
between one's status and the impact on a jury that would result
in undue influence sufficient to preclude a fair and impartial
trial. 6 However, the court has established a procedure which sig27
nifies a return to Johnston v. Belk-McKnight Co. of Newberry:
that a change of venue may be founded upon an existing prejudice in favor of an adverse party. Such prejudice can now be
established by the showing of a causal connection between one's
status, i.e., popularity, influence, and good reputation, and the
impact of such upon a jury, and furthermore, that the jury is
likely to delve into considerations beyond the scope of the evidence presented. 2
II.

ANTICIPATORY RELIEF

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
has expanded the principles of equity, comity, and federalism,
espoused by the Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris29 and
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,3" to find the doctrine of nonintervention
by a federal court applicable to state proceedings which have not
reached the level of actually being litigated in a state court. In
American Civil Liberties Union v. Bozardt,31 the court, without
directly stating its rationale, extended the policy against federal
intervention to deny declaratory and/or injuctive relief sought
subjected to foreign influences. Thus, there is no linchpin between the official
status of the respondent and associates and any actual or potentialimpact upon
prospective jurors .

. .

. Appellants [movants] did not satisfy the statutory

requirement that "there is reason to believe a fair and impartial trial can not
be had."
Id. at 69, 226 S.E.2d at 239.
26. It may be that the affidavit method of illustrating the impact upon a prospective
juror, see note 25 and accompanying text supra, is the only method which the court will
accept. Other courts have held that the presentation of facts justifying a conclusion of
undue influence or prejudice and a sufficient impact upon the jury to be sufficient to
create a belief that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had will warrant a change of venue.
In other words, a mere allegation or suspicion without more is not sufficient to warrant a
change of venue but the presentation of such facts does not have to reach the level of
certainty either. Tongate v. Erie R.R., 123 Misc. 580, 205 N.Y.S. 768 (1924); Smith v.
Hortler, 4 N.C. (Car. L. Rep.) 131 (1814); Swiggum v. Valley Inv. Co., 73 N.D. 765, 19
N.W.2d 569 (1945).
27. 194 S.C. 490, 10 S.E.2d 1 (1940).
28. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
29. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
30. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
31. 539 F.2d 340 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 639 (1976).
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against administrative procedures in general and disciplinary or
2
licensing procedures in particular.
The question left open after Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.33 was
to what extent the doctrine of nonintervention in state proceedings would extend once the federal plaintiff qualified under the
Anti-Injunction Statute.3 4 Prior to Huffman, the Supreme Court
had authorized the intervention of federal anticipatory relief only
in state criminal proceedings where the federal plaintiff could
demonstrate that such state proceedings caused him irreparable
injury both great and immediate, usually arising from bad faith
and harassment on the part of the state.3 5 Focusing primarily
upon the principles of comity and federalism, the Court in
Huffman held that the Younger restraints applied to pending
state civil proceedings which are "more akin to a criminal prosecution than are most civil cases" because the particular civil
proceedings are "in aid of and closely related to criminal stat36
utes."
The principles of comity and federalism were found by
Huffman to require restraint because
interference with a state judicial proceeding prevents the state
not only from effectuating its substantive policies, but also from
32. The purpose of this survey necessarily limits the scope of analysis. The analysis
of American Civil Liberties Union v. Bozardt begins with the Supreme Court's rationale
as expressed in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975), because this decision
accumulates the rationale of prior decisions for the purposes of this discussion. However,
one needs to be familiar with the prior decisions of the Supreme Court. For this purpose,
the cases of Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452
(1974); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971);
and Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), are vital for an in-depth analysis of the doctrine
of nonintervention and its exceptions. See also Bartels, Avoiding a Comity of Errors: A
Model for Adjudicating Federal Civil Rights Suits that "Interfere" with State Civil
Proceedings, 29 STAN. L. REv. 29, 31-43 (1976) (hereinafter cited as Bartels); Whitten,
Federal Declaratoryand Injunctive Interference with State Court Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits of Judicial Discretion, 53 N.C. L. REv. 591, 649-75 (1975)
(hereinafter cited as Whitten); Note, The New FederalComity: Pursuitof Younger Ideas
in a Civil Context, 61 IowA L. REv. 784 (1976) (hereinafter cited as IOWA Note); Comment,
Post-Younger Excesses in the Doctrine of Equitable Restraint:A CriticalAnalysis, 1976
DUKE L.J. 523, 526-48 (hereinafter cited as DUKE Comment).
33. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). Once the federal plaintiff qualifies under the AntiInjunction Statute, he still faces the hurdles of equity, comity, and federalism before
anticipatory relief from state proceedings will be granted. Niles v. Lowe, 407 F. Supp. 132,
134 (D. Hawaii 1976). See also DUKE Comment, supra note 32, at 540.
35. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 43-49; Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. at 73.
36. 420 U.S. at 604.
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continuing to perform the separate function of providing a
forum competent to vindicate any constitutional objections interposed against those policies. Such interference also results in
duplicative legal proceedings, and can readily be interpreted "as
reflecting negatively upon the state court ability to enforce constitutional principles."
. . .Thus, an offense to the State's interest in the nuisance
litigation is likely to be every bit as great as it would be were
this a criminal proceeding."
The extent to which the principles of equity require restraint
and nonintervention in Huffman is not clear. The Court recognized that the principles of equity pertaining to the doctrine of
equitable restraint and the principles of nonintervention applicable to criminal cases, where the litigant assuredly has an adequate remedy at law,3" technically are not applicable to civil proceedings. However, the classification of the civil proceeding as
one akin to and in aid of its criminal counterpart probably does
not totally rule out equity as a consideration, but its importance
after Huffman is hot as controlling a factor as it was in Younger. 39
How far this doctrine of equitable restraint and nonintervention in the field of anticipatory relief will extend in the area of
civil proceedings is a question that has not been answered by the
Supreme Court. There is language in Huffman which appears to
be very broad. The Court referred to its decision in Huffman as
the "civil counterpart"4 of Younger and relied upon two lower
court decisions which appear to abandon all distinctions between
state civil and criminal proceedings as authority. More important, the analysis of the Court in Huffman 2 is capable of being
applied to any type of proceeding. The consideration of the interests involved, the promulgation of substantive policies, interfer37. Id.
38. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 43-44. For an exhaustive and authoritative discussion of the historical roots of the principles of equity and equitable restraint, see Whitten,
supra note 32.
39. See Bartels, supra note 32, at 65; DUKE Comment, supra note 32, at 1205-06. See
also Cousins v. Wigoda, 409 U.S. 1201, 1205-06 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., opinion in chambers).
40. 420 U.S. at 611.
41. Id. at 607. "[The] application [of the principles of comity, equity, and federalism] should never be made to turn on such labels as 'civil' or 'criminal' but rather upon
an analysis of the competing interests in each case." Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769, 773
(4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974). See also Cousins v. Wigoda, 463 F.2d
603 (7th Cir.), applicationfor stay denied, 409 U.S. 1201 (1972).
42. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
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ence with state proceedings, duplication of procedures, and the
negative inference, inherent in intervention, regarding the state
courts' ability and good faith to protect individual rights, weigh
equally in favor of restraint and nonintervention on the part of
the federal court whether the proceeding be civil, criminal, quasicriminal, or even nonjudicial 3
A more restrictive reading is also possible in Huffman. The
proceeding under scrutiny in Huffman was found to be more
closely allied and akin to a criminal proceeding than most civil
proceedings. Indeed, it was found to be "in aid of and closely
related to" the criminal law." The fact that the state was a party
to the action and that the proceeding was a judicial one also
appear crucial to the Court's decision.45 Thus, it is equally possible that the Huffman extension is applicable only to judicial
proceedings, with the state as a party, which are akin to a criminal proceeding and are in aid of and closely related to the state's
interests underlying its criminal law.4
Thus, the Fourth Circuit in American Civil Liberties Union
v. Bozardt 7 was faced with a factual situation which, under either
a broad or restrictive interpretation of Huffman, required a certain amount of policy extension in order to find that the doctrine
of equitable restraint and nonintervention was applicable to anticipatory relief sought against state disciplinary procedures. The
question which is left unanswered after Bozardt is whether the
court merely extended the limitations which a restrictive interpretation requires by fitting the disciplinary procedures within
these limitations or whether the court rejected the restrictive, and
perhaps meaningless, classifications and adopted an analytical
scheme consisting of the interests involved in the proceeding and
the resulting degree of interference with the state proceedings
which the grant of federal anticipatory relief would create.
In Bozardt, the appellants, Jane Koe (a fictitious name) and
43. Grendco Corp. v. Rochford, 536 F.2d 197, 206 (7th Cir. 1976); Anonymous v.
Association of the Bar of N.Y., 515 F.2d 427, 432 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863
(1975); Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769, 773 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974).
See Theis, Res Judicata in Civil Rights Cases: An Introduction to the Problem, 70 Nw.
U.L. REV. 859, 870 (1976); Whitten, supra note 32, at 682; IowA Note, supra note 32, at
805-14; DUKE Comment, supra note 32, at 555-58.
44. 420 U.S. at 604.
45. Id.
46. Vail v. Quinlan, 406 F. Supp. 951, 958 (S.D.N.Y.) prob. juris noted sub nom.
Judice v. Vail, 426 U.S. 946 (1976). See also Bartels, supra note 32, at 45-46, 62-65.
47. 539 F.2d 340 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 639 (1976).
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the American Civil Liberties Union (hereinafter ACLU), sought
injunctive and declaratory anticipatory relief to block pending
state disciplinary proceedings by the Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline of the South Carolina Bar. These proceedings were initiated due to allegations of solicitation in the
suit of Doe v. Pierce.4" The district court dismissed the suit and
failed to intervene. On January 9, 1976, a private reprimand was
issued against the petitioner Koe. Appellants appealed to the
Fourth Circuit, alleging bad faith harassment, great and immediate harm,49 and the infringement of rights pursuant to the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 .1 The court in Bozardt affirmed the district
court's denial of federal anticipatory relief and thereby held the
Huffman rationale of equitable restraint and nonintervention to
be sufficiently expansive to act as a bar to the intervention in
disciplinary actions before an administrative body of the state.
The rationale that the Bozardt court used to find the principles of restraint in Huffman applicable to disciplinary proceedings is not entirely clear, as the court treated the application of
the principles of equitable restraint and nonintervention in a
rather conclusory manner. However, there are only two potential
rationales which the Bozardt court could have applied in finding
that nonintervention was required: (1) That the disciplinary proceedings fit within the restrictive reading of Huffman and qualified as judicial proceedings closely akin to a criminal proceeding
and in aid of the criminal law; or (2) that the civil-criminal distinction was not a crucial factor and the proceeding was of such
a crucial interest to the state that intervention by the federal
court's granting of anticipatory relief would cause such disruption
of the state proceeding, frustration of the effectuation of the state
substantive interest, and would impinge on the ability and the
good faith of the state to such an extent that nonintervention was
required on the part of the federal court.
A persuasive argument can be put forth that Bozardt is a
limited extension of Huffman in that the disciplinary proceeding
can be classified as a judicial proceeding akin to a criminal proceeding which is in aid of the state's criminal law.
The first issue to be addressed in such an argument is
48. Civil Action No. 74-475 (D.S.C. 1975).
49. Brief for Appellants at 13-18. ACLU v. Bozardt, 539 F.2d 340 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 97 S.Ct. 639 (1976).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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whether a disciplinary proceeding qualifies as a proceeding "more
akin to a criminal prosecution than are most civil cases. ' 51 In this
regard, several courts have classified similiar disciplinary proceedings as "quasi-criminal" and thus closely akin to a criminal
prosecution.12 This classification as a "quasi-criminal" proceeding is appropriate because the interests existent in the proceeding
are much greater than those which usually exist between private
civil litigants. The effect upon the attorney or the subject of the
disciplinary action is much the same as the effect of a criminal
proceeding. The attorney faces not only possible disbarment and
the loss of a livelihood, but also the serious impairment of his
professional reputation. Such an impairment could seriously
harm the attorney's relations with his clients to the extent that
he may not be able to function as he had previously and indeed
may lose not only potential future clients, but may conceivably
lose established clients, even if the disciplinary proceeding exonerates the attorney from all allegations of wrongdoing.55 Such an
effect -would, of course, apply with equal validity to disciplinary
proceedings in other professions. Thus, the valid classification of
a disciplinary proceeding as "quasi-criminal" forms the basis of
an argument that such a proceeding, as the one in Bozardt, is
more akin to a criminal, rather than a civil, proceeding.
Secondly, to interpret Bozardt as only a limited extension of
Huffman, it is necessary to classify the disciplinary proceedings
51. 420 U.S. at 604.
52. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968); Anonymous v. Association of the Bar of
N.Y., 515 F.2d 427, 432 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975); Goodrich v. Supreme
Court of S.D., 511 F.2d 316, 318 (8th Cir. 1975); Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205, 1208
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972). See Greene v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n, 411
F. Supp. 512, 516 (E.D. Va. 1976).
53. [I]n our view a court's disciplinary proceeding against a member of its
bar is comparable to a criminal rather than to a civil proceeding. A lawyer is
not usually motivated solely by the prospect of monetary gain in seeking admission to the bar or in practicing his chosen profession. However, it cannot be
disputed that for most attorneys the license to practice law represents their
livelihood, loss of which may be a greater punishment than a monetary fine.
[citations omitted] Furthermore, disciplinary procedures against an attorney,
while posing a threat of incarceration only in cases of contempt, may threaten
another serious punishment-loss of professional reputation. The stigma of such
a loss can harm the lawyer in his community and in his client relations as well
as adversely affect his ability to carry out his professional functions, particularly
if his branch of the law is trial practice. Undoubtedly, these factors played a
part in leading the Supreme Court to characterize disbarment proceedings as
being "of a quasi-criminal nature," In Re Ruffalo . . ..
Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205, 1209-10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972).
See also In re Abrams, 521 F.2d 1094, 1099 (3d Cir. 1975).
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not only as akin to a criminal prosecution, but also as a judicial
proceeding.54 This classification seems more attenuated than the
classification of the proceeding as "quasi-criminal" but it is an
argument of some merit. As the Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline is a mere investigative arm of the court
with only the power of recommendation, its acts are arguably for
and of the court, as the court itself has the exclusive power to
discipline a member of its bar. 5 As a judicial inquiry has been
defined as "one in which the court investigates, declares, and
enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and
under laws supposed already to exist,"5 an argument could be
put forth that the disciplinary proceeding is performing the inves57
tigative function of the court and thus is a judicial proceeding.
Inherent within this classification is the satisfaction of another
requirement of a restrictive Huffman rationale, that the state be
a party to the action. This is accomplished as the court and its
investigative arm, the disciplinary committee, initiates the proceeding.
It is also necessary to demonstrate that federal interference
in such state court proceedings would imply a lack of ability and
faithfulness on the part of the state court to protect a party's
constitutional rights." There is no doubt that if the federal anticipatory relief were granted in Bozardt, the court would have struck
an unfair blow to the integrity of the state judiciary.59 There is
no reason to believe that the state courts are not competent to
pass on the constitutionality of their own procedures and to protect adequately the rights of those who appear before it.'" Any
rights which would not be protected would also be reviewable
54. See notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text supra.
55. ACLU v. Bozardt, 539 F.2d 340, 344-45 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 639
(1976); Bums v. Clayton, 237 S.C. 316, 331, 117 S.E.2d 300, 307 (1960).
56. Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205, 1208 n.13 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
889 (1972).
57. See id. at 1208-09; Mildner v. Gulotta, 405 F. Supp. 182, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 1975),
aff'd sub noma.Gerzol v. Gulotta, 425 U.S. 901 (1976); Greene v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n,
411 F. Supp. 512, 516 (E.D. Va. 1976).
58. 420 U.S. at 609-11.
59. Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205, 1210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889
(1972); Niles v. Lowe, 407 F. Supp. 132, 136 (D. Hawaii 1976). See also Wallace v. Kern,
481 F.2d 621, 622 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1975).
60. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 609-11 (1975); Mildner v. Gulotta, 405 F.
Supp. 182, 198 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Gerzol v. Gulotta, 425 U.S. 901 (1976);
Gipson v. Supreme Court of N.J., 416 F. Supp. 1129, 1131 (D.N.J. 1976).
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upon appeal by that party to the Supreme Court.'
Finally, Bozardt may fall within a restrictive reading of
Huffman if it can be shown that the interest of the state is in aid
of and closely related to the criminal law of the state.6 2 This issue
is closely tied to the question of the degree of interference which
federal anticipatory relief in a state proceeding would cause. In
fact the two issues may be inseparable as the question, in reality,
becomes whether the state interest in the proceedings is comparable to that which exists in a criminal proceeding so that interfer63
ence by a federal court is equally great in either.
In a disciplinary proceeding, especially one of the bar, the
interest of the state is vital in nature. It is necessary for the state,
through its highest court and its officers, to be able to control the
integrity and character of its bar. The courts are exclusively responsible for the quality and discipline of the bar, even though
they may delegate some of their investigatory functions to an
administrative committee of the state bar.64 The state courts will
not be deterred from this obligation by interference of the federal
courts in this area unless the requisite great and immediate irreparable harm can be shown. Thus, the interest of the state in
providing the public with adequate and competent legal advice
is as great an interest to the state as the interest of curbing the
exhibition of pornography was in Huffman. It should also be
noted that the same conclusion may be reached with respect to
other administrative procedures as the analysis is equally applicable to nonbar proceedings where the interest of the state may be
equally great.6 5
61. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 605 (1975); Anonymous v. Association of
the Bar of N.Y., 515 F.2d 427, 432 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975).
62. 420 U.S. at 604.
63. Anonymous v. Association of the Bar of N.Y., 515 F.2d 427, 432 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975) ("The further inquiry is whether the proposed interference in

the civil case is comparable to the disruption in Huffman of the state's interest in maintaining the standards of the criminal laws."); Whitten, supra note 32, at 682; Note,

Younger Grows Older: EquitableAbstention in Civil Proceedings,50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 870,
883 n.62 (1975) ("The question first becomes which 'proceedings' rise to the level of
interest found in criminal cases."). See McCune v. Frapk, 521 F.2d 1152, 1158 (2d Cir.
1975).
64. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
65. The interest of the state court in adjudicating the continuing professional fitness and character of its own officers is at least as great as the interests
of the State of Ohio in policing the exhibition of pornographic material. Today
more than ever, the integrity of the bar is of public concern and the state which
licenses those who practice in its courts, and which is the only body which can
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The practitioner who wishes to invoke the doctrine of equitable restraint and nonintervention should be successful if he can
demonstrate the existence of all of the above factors. However,
the fact that an attorney is faced with a situation in which some
of the above factors exist while others are absent does not necessarily mean that the federal court will intervene and grant the
anticipatory relief sought. American Civil Liberties Union v.
Bozardt66 can equally be taken as authority not only for a limited
expansion of Huffman as described above where all the factors
must be present, but also for the proposition that a federal court
should deny anticipatory relief based on an interest analysis as
presented by each case coupled with an analysis of the degree of
accompanying interference.
The classification of the proceeding as "quasi-criminal,"
made in order to satisfy the requirement that the proceeding be
more akin to a criminal prosecution than most civil proceedings
dictated by a restrictive reading of Huffman, is a requirement
that is of little actual meaning in and of itself. The initial problem
with such a requirement is that it equates the police power of the
state with the state's criminal justice system. The label "quasicriminal" is attached to a proceeding in order to satisfy a strict
construction of Huffman but in reality it fails to advance any
analysis, since a disciplinary proceeding of the bar is a function
of the police power of the state and does not form a part of the
criminal justice system of the state; in other words, the power on
the part of the state to effectuate and promulgate its interest in
order to protect its citizens is much more expansive than its
power to punish activity as a part of its criminal law. 7 Thus, the
impose sanctions upon those admitted to practice in its courts, should not be

deterred or diverted from the venture by the interloping of a federal court. As
Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed in Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281
. . . (1957), the "two judicial systems of courts, the state judicatures and the
federal judiciary, have autonomous control over the conduct of their officers
among whom, in the present context, lawyers are included."
Anonymous v. Association of the Bar of N.Y., 515 F.2d 427, 432 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 863 (1975). See Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205, 1208-09 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972); Doe v. State Bar of Cal., 415 F. Supp. 308, 311 (N.D. Cal.
1976); Niles v. Lowe, 407 F. Supp. 132, 136 (D. Hawaii 1976); Mildner v. Gulotta, 405 F.
Supp. 182, 191-92 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd sub noma.Gerzol v. Gulotta, 425 U.S. 901 (1976);
Geiger v. Jenkins, 316 F. Supp. 370, 372-73 (N.D. Ga. 1970), ofl'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1970).
66. 539 F.2d 340 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 639 (1976).

67. Polk v. State Bar of Tex., 480 F.2d 998, 1001-02 (5th Cir. 1973); Niles v. Lowe,
407 F. Supp. 132, 135 (D. Hawaii 1976); Note, Younger Grows Older: EquitableAbstention

in Civil Proceedings, 50 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 870, 891 (1975). See Ahrensfeld v. Stephens, 528
F.2d 193, 198-200 (7th Cir. 1975); In re Ming, 469 F.2d 1352, 1353 (7th Cir. 1972).
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mere fact that a proceeding is labeled "quasi-criminal" does not
satisfy a restrictive reading of Huffman, as the argument put
forth above would seem to indicate," for the proceeding, even if
quasi-criminal in nature, does not protect the same interests as
the criminal justice system of the state is designed to protect.
Rather, the classification of the proceeding in Huffman as akin
to a criminal prosecution was intended to show that the interest
of the state in such a proceeding must be comparable to that
interest which the state possesses in its criminal justice system
to the extent that federal interference in either situation would
be equally annoying to the state. 9 Thus, Bozardt may more accurately be taken as authority for the proposition that an analysis
of the interest of the state and the interference which would result
if the federal court were to intervene is the proper analysis to be
used in determining whether the doctrine of equitable restraint
and nonintervention should bar the grant of anticipatory relief.
This proposition may be gleaned from Bozardt because the classification of a disciplinary proceeding as "quasi-criminal" fails to
satisfy the requirements of a restrictive interpretation of
Huffman. The premise that Bozardt requires an analysis of the
interest of the state rather than the nomenclature of the proceeding as "quasi-criminal" is further supported by the fact that the
South Carolina Supreme Court has declared that disciplinary
proceedings are not criminal in nature and are not designed for
the purpose of punishment. 0
The same rationale applies to the issue of the state's being a
party to the proceedings. It also is a tool only to insure that the
requisite interest and interference exist before anticipatory relief
is denied due to the principles of equitable restraint and nonintervention. There is no magic in the state's being a party to the
proceeding. The interest of the state may be as high in a proceeding between two individuals, especially where the effectuation of
a substantive state policy is at issue.7 1 Certainly the implication
68. See notes 51-53 and accompanying text supra.
69. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975) ("[An offense to the State's
interest in the nuisance litigation is likely to be every bit as great as it would be were this
a criminal proceeding."); see notes 63-65 and accompanying text supra. See Theis, Res
Judicata in Civil Rights Cases: An Introduction to the Problem, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 859,
870 (1976); DUKE Comment, supra note 32, at 555-73.
70. In re Kennedy, 254 S.C. 463, 176 S.E.2d 125 (1970); Bums v. Clayton, 237 S.C.
316, 117 S.E.2d 300 (1960).
71. Perhaps a hypothetical situation may be helpful. A, a resident of a.state with a
right-to-work law is employed by a private contractor on a military base with that state.
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that the state tribunals are not capable or lack the good faith
necessary to protect a party's right is the same whether the state
is a party or not, though the interference and annoyance to the
state may be less since it is less directly involved. Indeed, the
Fourth Circuit held prior to both Bozardt and Huffman that equitable restraint and nonintervention require the denial of anticipatory relief because of the competing interests involved in the prothe state is or is not a party, which in
ceeding and not because
72
that case it was not.

The classification of a disciplinary proceeding as a judicial
proceeding, so as to fit within a restrictive interpretation of
Huffman, was tenuous at best and such classification can probably be ruled out as a factor worthy of consideration in determining the applicability of the principle of nonintervention. Several
lower courts have recognized the fact that nonjudicial proceedings, e.g., administrative proceedings, may be of the same interest to the state as judicial proceedings and that the effect of intervention by the federal courts in either proceeding is interference
of the same degree. Thus, the principle has been recognized that
where the nonjudicial proceeding is of the requisite interest to the
state and interference would result in the same degree of intervention, 73 then the distinction between judicial and nonjudicial is
one of form over substance and the Huffman rationale is applica-

74
ble to nonjudicial proceedings as well.

His employer has a union-security agreement with the applicable union and A is forced
by his employer to join the union or be dismissed. A refuses and sues the employer and
union pursuant to the private right of action granted by the right-to-work law. The applicability of the state's right-to-work law is a difficult legal question and would be determined in the private action without an action by the state against the employer. Therefore, the state may well wish to present an argument. The issue is of vital concern to the
state and its policy but, due to the private right of action being brought first and thereby
disposing of the legal question of state regulation upon a federal enclave, the state is not
a party. The interest of the state is not any less as amicus curiae than it would be if it
had brought the action itself. Indeed, the interest of the state would not be any less even
if it did not present amicus argument. The interest of the state may be litigated without
the state's being a party to the action in any manner.
72. Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769, 773 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983
(1974). See Williams v. Williams, 532 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1976); Littleton v. Fisher, 530
F.2d 691 (6th Cir. 1976); Fisher v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 360 F. Supp. 207 (D.
Md. 1973). See also DUKE Comment, supra note 32, at 556-57.
73. See notes 58-65 and accompanying text supra.
74. McCune v. Frank, 521 F.2d 1152, 1158 (2d Cir. 1975) ("A proceeding in a state
court is not a pre-requisite to the applicability of Younger. . .Younger has relevance to
administrative proceedings. . . ."); Do-Right Auto Sales v. Howlett, 401 F. Supp. 1035,
1038 (N.D. I1. 1975). See DUKE Comment, supra note 32, at 558 n.14.
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The Supreme Court has intimated that this judicial/
nonjudicial distinction is one that will soon be abandoned. In
Rizzo v. Goode,75 the Court, in apparent dictum, seems to have
shattered this distinction by finding that equitable relief, which
injected the court into the internal disciplinary rules of the executive branch, was barred by the doctrine of equitable restraint and
nonintervention, with the Court again relying on an analysis of
the interest of the state and of the degree of interference which
would result from intervention. 71 Indeed, the Court found the
Huffman principles not only applicable to judicial proceedings,
but also applicable to the executive branch of the state government or agency.7 7 Thus, the distinction between judicial and nonjudicial proceedings is one that has been rejected by several lower
courts and may soon be rejected by the Supreme Court, if it has
not actually done so in Rizzo. A persuasive argument can be put
forth that Bozardt also rejected such a distinction, as the language in Bozardt which discusses the relationship between the
disciplinary proceeding and the court is not put forth to demonstrate the judicialness of the proceeding, but rather is used for the
purpose of demonstrating that the appellants did not exhaust
their state remedies, which is a distinct and separate requirement
of Huffman.S
One is left with an analysis of the interest on the part of the
state in the proceeding, the degree of interference with the state
proceeding, and the interest of the state that the granting of
federal anticipatory relief would create. At a minimum, one must
show the state's interest in the proceeding which is comparable
to the state's interest in its criminal laws. In other words, the
state proceeding must vindicate a state interest which is of sub75. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
76. Id. at 377-81.
77. [The principles of federalism which play such an important part in
governing the relationship between federal courts and state governments,
though initially expounded and perhaps entitled to their greatest weight in cases
where it was sought to enjoin a criminal prosecution in progress, have not been
limited either to that situation or indeed to a criminal proceeding itself. We
think these principles likewise have applicability where injunctive relief is
sought not against the judicial branch of the state government, but against those
in charge of an executive branch of an agency of state or local governments such
as respondents here.
Id. at 380. For more restrictive views of Rizzo, see Bartels, supranote 32, at 52 n.138; DUKE
Comment, supra note 32, at 566-72.
78. ACLU v. Bozardt, 539 F.2d 340, 343-45 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 639
(1976).
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stantial importance and which can be adequately promulgated
and effectuated only within the state procedure. If the state proceeding is necessary to effectuate a state interest as comparable
in importance to the state as its criminal laws, the doctrine of
equitable restraint and nonintervention should prevent the grant
79
of federal anticipatory relief.
As a corollary, it is also necessary to show that the degree of
interference by the grant of federal anticipatory relief will be
comparable to that interference which accompanies federal intervention in criminal proceedings. The negative implication upon
the state tribunals' ability to protect the party's constitutional
rights is a constant and remains the same whether the proceeding
be criminal, quasi-criminal, civil, or administrative. The key is
whether the interference with the effectuation of the state interest
is of the same nature as the interference with the criminal justice
system of the state. This question is intimately connected with
the prior issue of the substantial interest to the state which is
being promulgated. In other words, not only should the interference be such that it will negatively reflect upon the ability or good
faith of the state to protect the party's constitutional rights, but
more important since this reflection exists in any situation where
anticipatory relief is sought, the interference must also be of such
a degree that it would frustrate the state interest that is sought
to be effectuated and protected and would thus be an intolerable
burden to the implementation of such vital interests of the state.8 0
Thus, the vital factors which the Fourth Circuit in American
Civil Liberties Union v. Bozardt8' impliedly endorsed by applying
the principles of equitable restraint and nonintervention to state
disciplinary proceedings are those factors requiring an analysis of
the state's interests and the resulting interference of the grant of
federal anticipatory relief upon such interest of the state and
upon the integrity of such state proceedings necessary to the ef82
fectuation of such vital state interests.
79. See notes 62-65 and 68-70 and accompanying text supra. See also Bartels, supra
note 32, at 76-79; IOWA Note, supra note 32, at 812-15; DUKE Comment, supra note 32, at
555-73.
80. See notes 58-61 and accompanying text supra. See also Whitten, supra note 32,
at 682; DUKE Comment, supra note 32, at 555-73.
81. 539 F.2d 340 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 639 (1976).
82. The decision in Bozardt is also important for two other principles: (1) Younger
and Huffman require the outright dismissal of the federal action rather than abstention.
For further discussion of this topic, see Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The
Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071 (1974); Note, Federal
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT

3 the South
In Title Insurance Co. of Minnesota v. Christian,1
Carolina Supreme Court refused to impose a strict and literal
interpretation upon Circuit Court Rule 44(d).14 Appellant, Title
Insurance Co., sought damages alleging that Christian, Christian
and Mann, attorneys-at-law, were negligent and failed to exercise
reasonable professional skill in executing an application for a title
insurance policy. Appellant moved for summary judgment, supporting his motion with the affidavits of appellant's agent within
the state and of an officer of the bank involved in the case. 5 This
ostensibly brought the appellant within the literal scope of rule
44(d). Respondents did not come forward with a further evidentiary showing as required by the final two sentences of rule 44(d).
The trial judge, however, denied appellant's motion for summary
judgment. The appellant appealed on the basis that once the
motion for summary judgment is supported by the affidavits, rule
44(d) places on the adverse party the duty to come forward with
evidentiary material illustrating the existence of a genuine issue
of a material fact. If the adverse party does not produce such
material, appellant contended that the trial judge is under a duty
Courts, Injunctions, Declaratory Judgments, and State Law: The Supreme Court Has
Finally Fashioned a Workable "Abstention Doctrine," 25 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 75 (1976);
(2) The federal plaintiff is required to exhaust state remedies before seeking federal relief,
even when the action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). For further discussion on this topic, see Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975); Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239-43 (1972); DUKE Comment, supra note 32, at 538-41. See
generally Bartels, supra note 32.
83. 267 S.C. 71, 226 S.E.2d 240 (1976).
84. S.C. CIR. CT. R. 44. Rule for summary judgment:
(d) Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge,
or, if on information and belief shall state the sources of such, shall set forth
only such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be
attached thereto or served therewith. When a motion for summary judgment is
made and supported as provided in this Rule, an adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
Rule 44 is modeled after FED. R. Civ. P. 56, with Circuit Court Rule 44(d) corresponding to FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 267 S.C. at 75, 226 S.E.2d at 242, 243. See also Thevenot v.
Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n, 259 S.C. 235, 191 S.E.2d 251 (1972). As FED.
R. Cxv. P. 56 is the model for Circuit Court Rule 44, authority in the federal courts as to
rule 56 will be particularly persuasive.
85. Record at 12-17.
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to grant the motion for summary judgment,86 since the "adverse
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleadings." ' 7
The South Carolina Supreme Court, in affirming the denial
of appellant's motion, refused to interpret rule 44(d) as requiring
an automatic award of summary judgment when the movant has
supported his motion with affidavits and the adverse party does
not respond, by affidavit or otherwise. Whether the failure of the
adverse party to put forth controverting facts beyond the pleadings, thereby illustrating a genuine issue for trial, will result in
summary judgment is not determined by the mere fact that the
movant has supported his motion by affidavits. Rather, it is determined by whether the movant, on the basis of the materials
presented by his supporting affidavits, has established the absence of a genuine issue of a material fact. 8 A motion for summary judgment, therefore, may not be used by the movant as a
procedural device to avoid the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue.8 9
The effect of the decision in Christian is to place on the
movant for summary judgment the burden of establishing that
"no issue of fact is involved and inquiry into the facts is not
desirable to clarify the application of the law."" This burden
carried by the movant is a threshold issue which must be met by
the movant in order to avoid a denial of his motion.' Since all
86. Brief for Appellant at 3.
87. See note 84 supra.
88. The court stated:
"[The] party opposing summary judgment need not come forward in any way
if the moving party has not supported his motion to the point of showing that
issue is a sham." Brunswick Corp. v. Vineberg, 370 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1967). It
is also clear from the Advisory Committee's Notes on the 1963 Amendment to
Federal Rule 56 that "where the evidentiary matter in support of the motion
does not establish the absence of a genuine issue, summary judgment must be
denied, even if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented."
267 S.C. at 276, 226 S.E.2d at 242. See also Kaplan, Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 1961-1963 (II), 77 HARv. L. REv. 801, 827 (1964).
89, "A summary judgment is neither a method of avoiding the necessity for proving
one's case nor a clever procedural gambit whereby a claimant can shift to his adversary
his burden of proof on one or more issues." United States v. Dibble, 429 F.2d 598, 601
(9th Cir. 1970).
90. Gardner v. Campbell, 257 S.C. 209, 211, 184 S.E.2d 700, 701 (1971) (quoting
Phoenix Say. & Loan, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 381 F.2d 245, 249 (4th Cir. 1967)).
91. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970) ("As the moving party,
respondent had the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material
fact. . . ."); Rose v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 487 F.2d 804, 808 (7th Cir. 1973); Phoenix Say.
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inferences of fact from the materials offered by the parties must
2
be drawn against the movant and in favor of the adverse party,1
this burden is not easily met. Unless the movant satisfies the trial
judge that no conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence such that reasonable men would not differ, he has failed
to meet his burden of proof, and a summary judgment will be
denied, as in Christian. As stated in Phoenix Savings & Loan,
Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. :13
[S]ummary judgment should not be granted unless the entire
record shows a right to judgment with such clarity as to leave
no room for controversy and establishes affirmatively that the
adverse party cannot prevail under any circumstances. Neither
should summary judgment be granted if the evidence is such
that conflicting inferences may be drawn therefrom, or if reasonable men might reach different conclusions. 4
If the movant satisfies this burden by producing evidence
demonstrating the absence of genuine issues and supports his
motion with affidavits meeting the requirements of rule 44(d),
then the adverse party cannot rest on its pleadings and "must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
& Loan, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 381 F.2d 245, 249 (4th Cir. 1967); Doff v. Brunswick
Corp., 372 F.2d 801, 805 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 820 (1967). See generally 6
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACriCE § 56.1513], 56-463 to 473 (1976); 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRAcTIcE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2727 at 524-34 (1973) (hereinafter cited as
WRIGHT & MILLER); Bauman, A Rationale of Summary Judgment, 33 IND. L.J. 467, 472
(1958); Trautman, Motionsfor Summary Judgment: Their Use and Effect in Washington,
45 WASH. L. REV. 1, 2-6 (1970).

States which have rules of summary judgment similar to Circuit Court Rule 44(d) or
R. Civ. P. 56(e) have also held that the movant bears this initial burden of demonstrating the lack of a genuine issue for trial. Childs v. Lee, 224 Ga. 609, 163 S.E.2d 726
(1968); Barich v. Ottenstror, 550 P.2d 395 (Mont. 1976); Kidd v. Early, 289 N.C. 343, 222
S.E.2d 392 (1976); Tritchler v. West Virginia Newspaper Publishing Co., Inc., 193 S.E.2d
146 (W.Va. 1972).
The law does not seem to be settled as to whether the movant has the burden of proof
as to all genuine issues being shown to be nonexistent, United States v. General Motors
Corp., 518 F.2d 420, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1975), or if the movant has the burden of showing the
absence of genuine issue only as to those issues for which he would have the burden of
proof at trial, Capitol Indem. Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 357 F. Supp. 399,
410 (D.C. Wis. 1972). See generally Louis, FederalSummary Judgment Doctrine:A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE L.J. 745 (1974).
92. This proposition is well established in South Carolina. Eagle Constr. Co. v. Richland Constr. Co., 264 S.C. 71, 212 S.E.2d 580 (1975); Garrett v. Reese, 262 S.C. 327, 204
S.E.2d 432 (1974); Spencer v. Miller, 259 S.C. 453, 192 S.E.2d 863 (1972).
93. 381 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1967).
94. Id. at 249.
FED.
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trial.""' The reason that rule 44(d) will not allow a party to rest
on its pleadings is that the movant, by satisfying his initial burden of proof, has produced so much evidence as to controvert the
validity of the adverse party's pleadings to the extent that no
reasonable man would find veracity in the adverse party's allegations as presented by his pleadings." The meeting of this burden
by the movant triggers the latter part of rule 44(d) so as to shift
the burden of going forward to the adverse party. The adverse
party then bears the burden of producing specific facts which
tend to controvert the material initially produced by the movant.
The adverse party must go beyond his controverted pleadings and
demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue as to any material
fact."
95. See note 84 supra.
96. See Liberty Leasing Co. v. Hillsum Sales Corp., 380 F.2d 1013, 1015 (5th Cir.
1967); Durasteel v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 205 F.2d 438, 441 (8th Cir. 1953); 10 WRIGHT
& MILLER § 2727 at 537 (1973).
97. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160-61 (1970); Sweet v. Childs, 507
F.2d 675, 679 (5th Cir. 1975); Kolstad v. United States, 276 F. Supp. 757, 761 (D. Mont.
1967); 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.22[2] at 56-1344 to 1345 (1976); 10 WRIGHT &
MILLER § 2727 at 536-37 (1973); Bauman, A Rationaleof Summary Judgment, 33 IND. L.J.
467, 477 (1958).
The analysis provided in Doff v. Brunswick Corp., 372 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 820 (1967), is extremely useful.
[Oln a motion for summary judgment, it is the moving party who carries the
burden of proof; he must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists ...
Where on the basis of the materials presented by his affidavits, the moving
party, if at trial, would be entitled to a directed verdict unless contradicted, it
rests upon the opposing party at least to specify some evidence to show that such
contradiction is possible. [citations omitted] The burden of coming forward
with specific controverting facts shifts to the opponent. [citations omitted] It
is his duty to expose the existence of a genuine issue which will prevent the trial
from being a useless formality. [citation omitted] If he has a plausible ground
of defense, he must assert it.
Id. at 805 (citations omitted).
A prior line of cases in South Carolina also supports this position. Conran v. Yager,
263 S.C. 417, 211 S.E.2d 228 (1975); Garrett v. Reese, 262 S.C. 327, 204 S.E.2d 432 (1974);
Cisson v. Pickens Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 258 S.C. 37, 186 S.E.2d 822 (1972). The holding in
these cases was that the adverse party could not rely on his pleadings. A close reading,
however, illustrates that the movant in each case had met his burden of proof, and that
the burden of going forward with evidence had, in effect, shifted to the adverse parties,
though the issue was never directly addressed by the court in each situation. See also
Trautman, Motions for Summary Judgment: Their Use and Effect in Washington, 45
WASH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1970).
Other states which have similar rules to Circuit Court Rule 44(d) have also adopted
the rationale which requires the movant to meet the initial burden of proof as to the
absence of a genuine issue of a material fact which, if met, shifts the burden of producing
evidence to the adverse party as described above. Childs v. Lee, 224 Ga. 609, 163 S.E. 2d
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If the adverse party fails to meet this burden, he runs the risk
of having the movant's motion for summary judgment granted.
This risk becomes especially high if the adverse party does not
come forward at all. Indeed, only in the very unusual case should
the motion be denied where the movant has met his burden and
the adverse party has failed to come forward. 98 The movant can
never be completely assured of having a summary judgment
granted since the trial judge does have the discretion to deny such
a motion even though the movant has technically met his burden.
The trial judge should always have the discretion to allow the
case to proceed to trial whenever any doubt as to the motion for
summary judgment exists.99
If the movant fails to controvert a genuine issue alleged by
the adverse party in his pleadings or fails to produce sufficient
evidence such that reasonable men would not differ, then the
movant has failed to satisfy his initial burden. In such a case, the
burden of production does not shift to the adverse party.'"0 In
other words, in this situation the adverse party's pleadings remain valid, and such party is entitled to stand on his pleadings.
In accordance with its federal counterpart, rule 44(d) as interpreted by Christian does not require an adverse party to come
forward when the movant has not shown an absence of a genuine
issue as to a material fact. 0 1
In Title Insurance Co. of Minnesota v. Christian,0 the appel726 (1968); Barich v. Ottenstror, 550 P.2d 395 (Mont. 1976); Mitchell v. K.W.D.S., Inc.,
26 N.C. App. 409, 216 S.E.2d 408, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 242, 217 S.E. 2d 665 (1975);
Burns v. Cities Serv. Co., 217 S.E.2d 56 (W. Va. 1975); Wood v. Trenchard, 550 P.2d 490
(Wyo. 1976).
98. Indeed, this is the situation which Circuit Court Rule 44(d) and FED. R. Civ. P.
56(e) were designed to meet. Advisory Committee Notes to the 1963 Amendments, 31
F.R.D. 647, 648-49.
99. 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.23 at 56-1390 to 1391 (1976); 10 WRIGHT &
MILLER § 2728 at 555 (1973).
100. See notes 94 & 96 and accompanying text supra.
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e) has been interpreted almost uniformly also to require the
movant to meet his burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of a material
fact before the adverse party must come forward. If the movant does not meet this burden,
the adverse party can successfully rest on his pleadings. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144, 159-60 (1972); Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709, 714 (10th
Cir. 1974); Brunswick Corp. v. Vineberg, 370 F.2d 605, 611-12 (5th Cir. 1967); 6 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.22[2] at 56-1344 (1976); 10 WRIGHT & MILLER § 2739 at 717-19
(1973); Advisory Committee Notes to the 1963 Amendments, 31 F.R.D. 647, 648-49. See
Elmwood Cemetery Ass'n v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 255 S.C. 457, 179 S.E.2d 609
(1971). See also Kaplan, Amendments of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure 1961-1963
(II), 77 HARv. L. REV. 801, 827 (1964).
102. 267 S.C. 71, 226 S.E.2d 240 (1976).
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lant/movant failed to meet this initial burden. The appellant
ostensibly came within the scope of rule 44(d) by supporting his
motion for summary judgment with affidavits, but such support
as appellant presented in his affidavits failed to demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue. Appellant left uncontroverted the
defense, raised by respondents' answer and appearing as part of
the title insurance policy, of knowledge on the part of the insured.
Such an uncontroverted defense presented a genuine issue of
material fact, requiring the denial of summary judgment. 3 It
would follow that any allegation in the pleadings of the adverse
party, which if factually true would constitute either a defense or
basis of liability at law (depending on whether the adverse party
is the defendant or plaintiff in the action), inherently presents an
issue of material fact for the jury, if the movant fails to controvert
such allegation to the extent that reasonable men would not differ
as to the invalidity of such allegation. In this situation, the respondent/adverse party is under no obligation to come forward.'0 4
In Christian, if the appellant had come forward in the first
instance with evidentiary material refuting the defense by respondents, the court intimates that this would have been sufficient to meet the initial burden placed upon the movant and,
thus, to shift the burden of production to the respondent.' 5
W. Irl Reasoner
103. Id. at 76-77, 226 S.E.2d at 242-43.
104. See note 101 and accompanying text supra. As a practical matter, the adverse
party may be wise to come forward with material demonstrating the existence of a genuine
issue or at least seek a continuance under Circuit Court Rule 44(e), even if the adverse
party believes the movant has failed to meet his burden of proof. See Bankers Trust of
S.C. v. Benson, 267 S.C. 152, 226 S.E.2d 703 (1976); 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.23
at 56-1390 to 1392 (1976).
105. 267 S.C. at 77, 226 S.E.2d at 243.
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